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Abstract 
Purpose: The article conducts the study an Egyptian Christian husband who divorced his wife by his unilateral will an in-
depth background and analytical study in Egyptian law. 
Methodology: This is analytical-logical research based on the religious and legal texts of divorce. 
Result: regarding a Christian husband’s right to divorce his wife by his unilateral will when the terms for divorce, there is 
no dispute regarding the application of Sharia, and a Christian husband does not have this right and a court ruling is 
necessary for the divorce to be effective. 
Applications: This research can be used for families and Legal organizations for marriage and divorce. 
Novelty/Originality: In this research, the model of the divorced wife by his unilateral in Egyptian law is presented in a 
comprehensive and complete manner. 
Keywords: Divorce, Personal Statute, Islamic Sharia. Unilateral will of the Husband.  
INTRODUCTION 
The topic of the Research 
Civil law is universally acknowledged as the law that governs relationships between individuals regardless of the nature of 
such a relationship, including the legal relationship between an individual and his community, and hence establishes the 
legal status created by these relationships. 
An individual’s relationships in his community are relevant either to his personal status or to financial issues. This is why 
the civil law in most countries of the world governs both these relationships, the personal and the financial. 
However, due to certain historical circumstances in Egypt, the relationships of citizens’ personal status have not only 
become independent and separate from civil law but also set forth diverse legal principles of personal status due to the 
diverse religions, doctrines, and sects of the Egyptian community. Thus, the legislator is not governed by uniform 
principles that apply to all those living on Egyptian territory, but such relationships are governed by the personal statute of 
every individual according to his religion or sect. 
The Egyptian legislator considered the law of nationality as the law of personal statute for foreigners. But the law that 
governs issues of personal relationships for Egyptians is the law of personal statute, as is provided for in Article 11 of Law 
No. 1 from 2000, which is the law relevant to religions that states, 
Court rulings shall be issued in accordance with the prevalent personal statute and the Wakfs. As regards issues that are not 
covered by the provisions of these laws, then the most preponderant opinion of the doctrine (Mazhab) of Imam Abi Hanifa 
shall apply. However, court rulings in disputes of personal status between non-Muslim Egyptians of the same sector 
doctrine that have judicial religious bodies organizing their personal status up to 31 December 1955 shall be issued 
according to the provisions of their own law of personal status set forth in their religion or faith or sect, so long as these 
provisions are not in contradiction with public order. 
Thus, the enforceable positive laws in cases of personal status, foremost of which is divorce, are diverse. 
Therefore, a judge may in one case apply Islamic Sharia Law and in others apply the provisions of laws of other sects 
according to the religion of the litigants. For as we stated earlier, not all Egyptians are governed by uniform rules and 
principles when it comes to issues of personal status, unlike cases of real estate disputes, where all Egyptians are governed 
by one law. 
Thus, the provisions of Islamic Sharia Law are applicable only to Egyptian Muslims in cases of personal status, while the 
religious principles of the different sects govern the disputes of the personal status of non-Muslim Egyptians if they are of 
the same sect or faith. 
It has been established in Islamic Sharia Law that a Muslim husband may unilaterally divorce his wife with no need for a 
court ruling to make such a divorce effective. 
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It is also established in Christianity, with all its sects and doctrines that a husband may not unilaterally divorce his wife 
(“For what God has united no man may separate”). Even in precise faiths such as the Protestant or Orthodox where divorce 
is allowed in certain definite cases, such divorce must be based on a court ruling, as determining and investigating the 
causes of such allowable divorce is an issue that is left to the discretion of the judge and not to the sole will of the husband 
[Ramadan Abu El Seoud, Al Wageez, 1986]. 
All sects of Christianity do not consider divorce as an absolute right of a husband that he may make effective by merely 
uttering the oath of divorce to his wife and consequently end the marriage bond. This is clearly set forth in all its different 
sects and doctrines that allow divorce, and hence breaking the marriage bond is only allowed for certain precise reasons, 
provided that such breaking may only be fulfilled by a court ruling and is never fulfilled by the unilateral will of either the 
husband or the wife or even both of them [Ahmed Salama, 1963]. 
Whereas Islamic Sharia Law allows a Muslim husband to unilaterally divorce his wife with no need for a court ruling to 
validate such divorce, a question was raised as to whether a Christian husband may benefit from such provision and hence 
be able to divorce his non-Muslim wife by his own unilateral wish and with no need for a court ruling to validate such 
divorce in cases where the conditions allowing divorce in Christianity do not apply and the provisions of Islamic Sharia 
Law would be the applicable provisions on the grounds that the husband in such a case may be governed by the provisions 
of Islamic Sharia Law, or is the right of a husband to divorce his wife by his own unilateral will is the exclusive right of a 
Muslim husband? 
The Importance of the Research 
The purpose of conducting this study is to guide our legislator before he takes his expected step of unifying the objective 
basis of the law of personal status while carefully taking into consideration the faiths of both Muslims and non-Muslims, a 
matter that is neither difficult nor new to the Egyptian legislator. 
It is not difficult as there are numerous issues relevant to marriage and its consequences that may be unified without 
difficulty, as they do not deal with religious principles, but for other issues relevant to religion, the principles would be 
different in each religion. These issues of differences are limited in number. Therefore, special principles would be laid 
down for each faith in accordance with the preponderant principles of each religion regardless of the sectarian differences 
as such differences do not affect the substantial principles of the religion but are only differences in the points of view in 
the interpretation of religious texts. 
This is also not new to the Egyptian legislator, who unified the jurisprudence of all these issues when they were scattered 
among different authorities. For in 1955, Law No. 462 was enacted, putting an end to Islamic Sharia courts and the Milli 
(Egyptian Christian) courts and referring all cases that were under consideration by these courts until 31 December 1955 to 
the national courts to proceed with their consideration in accordance with the Code of Procedures. Thus, the ordinary 
courts were given full jurisdiction to consider disputes between all Egyptians, Muslims and Christians alike. The 
jurisdiction of the national ordinary courts had been recognized and established earlier with regard to foreigners after the 
lapse of the transitional period following the cancellation of the mixed and consular courts. The jurisdiction of the national 
ordinary courts to consider all different disputes, including cases of personal status, was recognized as a result of the 
enactment of Law No. 462 in 1955.  
The methodology of the Research 
We shall follow here a mixed methodology that combines the deep consideration of the background of the hypothesis of 
the research and the analytical approach. The research seeks to examine the background of the details that give rise to the 
question that the study poses and attempts to arrive at general principles that may govern those details. We shall also apply 
the analytical approach, as we are going to examine the general principles and rules and then attempt to apply them to 
different details. This process requires considering and examining the details of all points of view and provisions relevant 
to the topic of the research so that we may ultimately answer the question that it raises.  
1.4 Plan of the Research 
The opinions of the Egyptian jurists responding to this main question of the research were diverse and divided into three 
main approaches, and we shall deal with each one separately as follows: 
The first approach is that divorce may only be made effective by a court ruling. 
The second approach is that divorce may be made effective by the unilateral will of the husband. 
The third approach is that divorce may become effective by the unilateral will of the husband in cases of a dispute. 
THE FIRST APPROACH: THAT DIVORCE MAY ONLY BECOME EFFECTIVE BY A COURT RULING 
Content of the Approach 
Some jurists believe that non-Muslims may apply the principles of Islamic Sharia Law if they so wish, provided that the 
law approves such a divorce. They believe that non-Muslims if they are followers of the same non-Muslim creed or sect, 
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may apply the provisions of their own sect of religion on their own, as the principles of their religion govern their 
relationships. But the application of Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims is the exception that may only be applied if 
requested from a judge. This stand shall not harm a Christian husband, as Christianity does not recognize the divorce made 
by the unilateral will of the husband. Thus, all the benefits that a Christian husband may gain by applying Islamic Sharia 
Law are that he would be allowed to file a case before the court requesting the application of Islamic Sharia Law to his 
case. The judge would then first ensure that the conditions of divorce in Islamic Sharia Law apply to his case. Then, should 
the judge believe that such provisions do apply, then he would issue a ruling of the validity of the divorce declared by the 
unilateral will of the husband, in which case the divorce shall not be valid from the date declared by the husband, as is the 
case with a Muslim husband, but from the date of its validation by the court [Helmi Botros, 1956]. 
This means that a non-Muslim husband has to refer to the court to request the application of Islamic Sharia Law to his 
case. Then, the divorce that he has unilaterally made would become valid by a court ruling. 
Supporters of this opinion build it on three basic arguments: first on legitimate considerations, second on practical 
considerations, and third on technical needs. 
The Legitimate Considerations 
Islamic jurisprudence is of the opinion that issues relevant to marriage of non-Muslims should be governed by the 
principles and rules of their own religion on the grounds that the principles of Islamic Sharia Law were not intended to 
apply to them, and it is well established in Islamic Sharia Law that a Muslim husband has the right to divorce his wife by 
his own unilateral will [Gamal Morsi Bishr, 1956].  Supporters of this opinion believe that a Muslim husband’s declared 
oath of divorce is relevant to his belief in his religion; thus, his unilateral declaration of the oath of divorce makes such a 
divorce valid and effective and hence breaks the marriage bond. Here, the religious penalty is mixed with the legal penalty. 
Thus, it is difficult to apply this principle to individuals who do not basically believe in the religion that considers a 
husband’s declared oath of divorce to his wife to actually separate them and end the marriage bond. Moreover, it is well 
established that for a divorce to be effective by the sole oath of divorce of the husband, the husband himself must be 
legally capable – that is, mature and sane in mind (compos mentis) [Mendes & Silva, 2018]. 
Furthermore, from the emotional point of view, it is difficult to make a divorce of a Christian husband by his unilateral will 
acceptable, as none of the Christian sects allow such a divorce. The legalization of a divorce made in this manner would 
provoke religious sentiments [Tawfik Hassan Farag, 1969]. 
The Practical Considerations 
The application of the principles of Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims faces several difficulties, particularly as regards 
proving whether the non-Muslim couple is of the same sector doctrine or not, whether either of them has changed his sect 
or doctrine or not, and whether the principles of their religion are compatible with public order or not. Therefore, it is 
necessary that investigating these and other issues are left to the discretion of the judge. For it is the judge who is capable 
of determining which law governs the case under his consideration, for as mentioned earlier, he must investigate whether 
both the husband and wife are of the same sector doctrine or not and if the rules of their religion are compatible with public 
order. All these are issues that cannot be determined by the individuals themselves but have to be referred to the court to 
give its decision in a court ruling. Any claim in contradiction with this principle would lead to the disruption of family 
relationships, as the decision of an individual may be in contradiction with the law. A husband might believe that he has 
actually divorced his wife, but in reality, and according to the law, he would still be married to her [Mostafa, 2002]. 
Therefore, a non-Muslim husband may not benefit from the principles of Islamic Sharia Law and divorce the wife of his 
own unilateral will unless the judge, after investigating the whole case, decides that the conditions of this law are 
applicable to this case [Mostafa, 2002]. 
Furthermore, allowing a Christian husband to divorce his wife by his unilateral will would open the door wide to attempts 
to circumvent to end a marriage bond, as a non-Muslim couple may agree, by themselves, that a husband could take the 
unilateral decision of divorce, and the wife would accept his decision and not contest whether the terms of making such a 
decision valid apply or not. Thus, the marriage bond would be broken by the mere agreement of the couple, a situation that 
is definitely not permissible [Mostafa, 2002]. 
The Technical Consideration 
The third consideration in support of this opinion is based on the interpretation of the statement “Court rulings shall be 
issued” mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 6 of law No. 462 of 1955, which provides that 
With regard to disputes relevant to issues of personal status of non-Muslim Egyptians of the same faith or sect or doctrine 
who have their own organized religious legal authorities at the time of the enactment of this law, court rulings shall be 
issued in accordance with the principles of their religion. 
Whereas it is well understood that, in accordance with the concept of contradiction with this paragraph, should the terms 
and conditions for the application of the specific religion not apply, then the court rulings shall be issued in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 28 of the regulations determining the order of the religious courts. That is in accordance with 
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the provisions of Islamic Sharia Law. This means that when the legislator predicted the possibility of the application of 
Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims, he necessarily assumed that such an application would be through a court ruling. The 
statement “court rulings” is definite in this respect, as the term “rulings “means the result of a court action. Thus, whatever 
is issued in accordance with a certain jurisdiction is not a court ruling. Therefore, individuals may not by themselves take 
the decision of applying Islamic Sharia Law. Should they do so, their decision would have no consequences from the date 
of their decision, but only from the date of the court ruling, even if the court applies Islamic Sharia Law [Mostafa, 2002]. 
Assessment of the Approach 
This approach is considered defective for the following reasons: 
1. That marriage and its consequences are mostly considered in Islamic Sharia Law as relevant to dealings and not to acts 
of worship. Hence, for an individual to be legally capable, he must be mature and sound of mind, not a Muslim. 
Therefore, nothing prevents the application of Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims in this respect [Hossam El din 
Kamel Elahwany, 1972].  
2. That although other religions do not acknowledge divorce by the unilateral will of both the husband and wife or either 
of them separately, divorce with the unilateral will is not in contradiction with Christianity. For there is evidence that 
Christian doctrines – with the exception of the Catholic doctrine – have recognized divorce during a certain stage of 
their development and up to the present. Therefore, it is not true that a declaration of the oath of divorce by a Christian 
husband to his wife of his own unilateral will is in contradiction with the Christian faith itself [Hossam El din Kamel 
Elahwany, 1972]. 
3. That it adds to legal texts a restriction that they do not include in the first place, by virtue of which Islamic Sharia Law 
may not be applied to non-Muslims except by a court ruling. This restriction is even strange to the principles of Islamic 
Sharia Law itself, which does not oblige a Muslim husband to refer to the courts to validate such a divorce but allows 
him to divorce his wife by his sole unilateral will. Hence, jurisprudence may not introduce such a restriction so long as 
the legislator and the principles of Islamic Sharia Law do not provide for it [Hossam El din Kamel Elahwany, 1972]. 
4. That it creates unacceptable discrimination between the application of non-Muslim individuals of the laws of their 
religion and their application of Islamic Sharia Law. For it allows them to apply the first without having to refer to the 
court on the grounds that it is the basic principle governing their relationships, while it does not allow them to apply the 
second on the grounds that it is the exception. But what is the relationship between considering certain legal provisions 
as basic and the necessity of referring them to the court to apply them? No one claimed that individuals may by 
themselves apply general rules and that only the exceptions need to be applied by the law. For all legal principles, 
general or exceptional, are binding and should be respected by all individuals by themselves, or else they will be forced 
by the law to respect them. This means that referral to the court may only be applied if individuals by themselves do not 
abide by the law. Thus, whether we consider this issue as part of the general basic rules of the law or as an exception is 
of no value. The issue includes in essence two options only: First, a Muslim couple may apply the principles of divorce 
as set forth in Islamic Sharia Law without having a dispute between them as to its applicability, in which case it would 
be irrational to force them to refer the issue to the court, as courts do not have the jurisdiction to consider such a 
request. That is, the court may not issue a legal opinion confirming that a certain legal principle is the applicable one to 
a dispute that may or may not take place. The most important prerequisite for a case to be filed before a court is the 
existence of a current and urgent dispute. The assumption here is the non-existence of such a dispute. Therefore, such a 
case is unacceptable by the court as it lacks the most important prerequisite for accepting it, namely, the existence of a 
dispute. The second option is for the husband to divorce the wife of his own unilateral will in accordance with the 
provisions of Islamic Sharia Law and the wife to contest such a divorce before the court. Should the court ensure that at 
the time the husband had taken the unilateral division of divorcing his wife he did so in accordance with the principals 
of Islamic Sharia Law, then the court ruling would validate the divorce and it would be enforced as of the date of the 
unilateral decision of the husband. Claiming otherwise that such a divorce would only enter into force on the date of the 
court ruling validating it shall render the case one of requesting a divorce and not a divorce actually made by the 
unilateral will of the husband. This stand would be in contradiction with the principles of Islamic Sharia Law that do 
not acknowledge filing a case by the husband to divorce his wife but only acknowledge the filing of a case requesting a 
divorce by the wife. Whereas the assumption here is that the husband has taken the unilateral decision of divorcing his 
wife, then the only acceptable status is to acknowledge the fact that the divorce did enter into force from the date of his 
unilateral decision of divorce. 
5. That what is called technical consideration is not acceptable. The statement “Court rulings shall be issued” mentioned 
in Article 6 cannot possibly mean that the legislator necessarily assumed that the application of the principles of Islamic 
Sharia Law and not the principles of other non-Muslim faiths shall be applicable by a court ruling. This is for two 
reasons: First, the legislator used this phrase with regard to the application of the principles of other non-Muslim sects, 
and hence stated, “Court rulings shall be issued according to their own sectarian laws”. Yet supporters of this approach 
did not argue that non-Muslims may apply the principles of their own religion on their own with no need for a court 
ruling. Hence, the statement “according to the provisions” is not decisive in this respect. That is, it does not prevent the 
application of Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims with no need for a court ruling. The second reason for rejecting this 
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approach is that the legislator’s use of this phrase is basically due to the fact that law No. 462 of 1955 is essentially the 
law organizing the judiciary, as it has cancelled the Islamic Sharia courts and the Christian Special Canon (Melli) 
courts and referred cases under the consideration of these courts to the national courts. Thus, it is only normal that such 
phrase is directed to the judiciary to govern the rulings that they issue. Therefore, the provisions of this law must not be 
interpreted as only to be applied by a court. The provisions of the law are enacted so that individuals will of their own 
choice abide by them. Consequently, if they do not, then anyone who has a current and urgent interest in applying a 
certain legal rule may turn to the court to request that it apply this provision by force. Furthermore, the statement 
“Court rulings shall be issued” is mentioned in every article of the law. Therefore, in this respect only, the legislator 
was influenced in using this phrase by the basic objectives for which this law was enacted [Hossam El din Kamel 
Elahwany, 1972]. 
6. Finally, practical consideration cannot be accepted as it is based on the possibility of non-Muslim individuals 
committing an error in the application of the law. The response to this possibility is that one’s ignorance of the law does 
not relieve him of the penalty for committing a punishable error, as it is assumed that everybody knows the provisions 
of the law regardless of the difficulty of implementing them and regardless of the possibility of committing an error in 
such implementation. Moreover, the judges of merit themselves are not immune to committing such an error in the 
application of the law. This is why the Court of Cassations has been established to control the sound application of the 
law by the judges [Tangho, 1968].  
7. That knowledge of the applicable legislation is not a difficult issue that cannot be conceived by individuals, as it is well 
established that it is the law that determines the legislative jurisdiction, and it is generally assumed that individuals are 
aware of the law. Hence ignorance of it is not an acceptable excuse [Tangho, 1968].  
8. That the request of individuals to a judge to determine which is the applicable law to their case, whether it is the law of 
their religion or Islamic Sharia Law, is not one of the responsibilities of the judge but is the responsibility of the 
authority responsible for giving religious opinions. The judiciary is not responsible for giving such religious opinions. 
9. Finally, that the wish of the supporters of this approach is to maintain and protect family relationships and not disturb 
them or open the door wide to acts of circumvention of the law, and although this approach is benevolent in itself, it is 
not sufficient alone as a legal basis to support this approach, in that the judge must be committed to applying a 
restriction introduced by jurisprudence that has no roots whatsoever in the law. 
THE SECOND APPROACH: THAT A DIVORCE MAY BECOME EFFECTIVE BY THE UNILATERAL WILL 
OF THE HUSBAND  
Content of the Approach 
Supporters of this approach believe that a Christian husband may divorce his wife by his sole unilateral will so long as the 
terms of divorce of his own religion do not apply, in which case the principles of Islamic Sharia Law that allow a husband 
to divorce the wife of his unilateral will shall apply with no need to refer to the court. The Egyptian judiciary has supported 
this approach in many of its rulings [Al Waseet, 1968].   It has established that Islamic Sharia Law allows a husband to 
divorce his wife by his unilateral will, and this is the applicable law in cases of personal status of non-Muslim Egyptian 
followers of different religions or sects, and that in such cases, court rulings shall be issued in accordance with Article 280 
of the Regulations arranging the order of Islamic Sharia courts.  
Should the judge deduce from the papers of the case and within his objective authority that the husband had adopted the 
Coptic faith before filing the case, while the wife had been a Coptic Orthodox and both sects condemn divorce, and that the 
principles of Islamic Sharia Law which allow a husband to divorce his wife by his unilateral will, had been applied to their 
case, therefore, and as had been established by the rulings of the Court of Cassation, he would not have violated the law or 
erred in its application [Selomo & Govender, 2016]. 
Thus, even if the non-Muslim couple disputed whether the divorce took place by the unilateral will of the husband or not, 
this still would not mean that the divorce would become valid on the date of the court ruling as claimed by the supporters 
of the above approach, for it is sufficient, in this respect, that the divorce is later referred to the court to decide which 
principles of which religion govern this divorce. Thus, if it is proven that the terms and conditions of divorce of other non-
Muslim sects apply, then the divorce is valid. But should the court find that the principles of the laws of other religions do 
not apply to the dispute, and it is the provisions of Islamic Sharia Law that do, then the divorce would be valid since it has 
been proven that the principles of Islamic Sharia Law have the jurisdiction to govern the case; the divorce would thus be 
valid from the date that it had been declared by the husband and not from the date of the court ruling validating it. 
However, should the divorce take place before the jurisdiction of Islamic Sharia Law has been acknowledged, then this 
would mean that the divorce did not enter into force, as the divorce took place at a time when both husband and wife were 
not governed by Islamic Sharia Law, and thus the husband had no right to divorce his wife by his sole unilateral will.  
This approach was approved by almost all courts, foremost among which is the Court of Cassation, the rulings of which 
have established that a Christian husband may by his unilateral divorce his wife and thus break the marriage bond by his 
mere declaration of it. In this respect, the religion of the husband does not matter, whether he is a Muslim or a non-Muslim, 
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as he is employing a right derived from the application of the provisions of Positive Islamic Sharia Law. However, this 
approach has been severely attacked and criticized by supporters of the first and third approaches.  
Assessment of the Approach 
This approach was considered defective for the following reasons: 
1. That it is emotionally difficult to declare that a Christian husband may divorce his wife by his unilateral will. 
2. That this opinion is in violation of all the doctrines and sects of Christianity, as none of them allow a husband to 
divorce his wife by his unilateral will. Thus, all Christian religious bodies do not practically acknowledge a divorce that 
has been validated by the court and consider the marriage bond still existing so long as any cause for divorce according 
to Christianity does not exist, and they consequently prevent both the husband and the wife from having another 
spouse. Moreover, neither of them could find a church that would conclude a new marriage for either. This issue caused 
a lot of embracement for Christian religious authorities, a matter which the regulations of the religious courts thought to 
avoid by prohibiting the application of Islamic Sharia Law with regard to the marriage of those Christians who do not 
believe in divorce [Alwahdani, 2019]. 
3. That this approach opens the door wide for Christian couples to break their marriage bond by their own agreement, by 
changing their religious sect or doctrine, and consequently a husband could divorce his wife by his own unilateral will, 
which is a matter prohibited by Christianity [Alwahdani, 2019]. 
4. That adopting such an approach may inflict harm on the family, as a Christian husband who believes that it is Islamic 
Sharia Law that governs his marital relationship and hence divorces his wife by his unilateral will and even gets 
another wife, although the principles of Islamic Sharia Law do not apply to him, and his divorce, in this manner, has 
actually not taken place and he is still legally married to his first wife, inflicts grave harm on himself and on others 
[Selomo & Govender, 2016]. 
THE THIRD APPROACH: THAT DIVORCE MAY BE EFFECTIVE BY THE UNILATERAL WILL OF THE 
HUSBAND IN CASE OF A DISPUTE  
Content of the Approach 
A new approach that stands between the two above-mentioned approaches has appeared. Supporters of this approach 
believe that there should be a differentiation between two cases. The first is where a dispute erupts regarding which is the 
applicable law to this case, that of the non-Muslim religion or that of Islamic Sharia Law, and the second where there is no 
dispute regarding the application of Islamic Sharia Law to the dispute if the non-application of the terms and conditions of 
divorce in the laws of other religions is obvious Fahmy, H. (2012). 
In the first case, a husband may make the divorce effective by his unilateral will. For if there exists a dispute between the 
husband and wife, neither of them should have a right that results from the settlement of such dispute. Thus, a husband 
must not be authorized to make a divorce effective except upon the issuing of a court ruling confirming that the provisions 
of non-Muslim laws do not apply to the dispute, and that it is the principles of Islamic Sharia Law that govern the 
relationship of the couple, and that no divorce shall be considered in force except the date of issuance of the court ruling 
validating it, as it is such ruling that creates rights, not only approves them. It is such a ruling that creates rights for a non-
Muslim husband in accordance with Islamic Sharia Law. But in the second case where there is no dispute between the 
couple as to the application of Islamic Sharia Law, then there would be no doubt that a husband may benefit from the 
provisos of this law, as is the case with any Muslim husband, and hence may divorce his wife by his unilateral will. 
However, should the wife contest the right of the husband to make the divorce effective by his unilateral will in spite of 
accepting the application of Islamic Sharia Law in principle, then the court would issue its ruling confirming the validity of 
such divorce from the date of its declaration by the husband. For so long as we have accepted the application of Islamic 
Sharia Law to both husband and wife, and this is accepted in the assumption proposed here, we may not accept applying 
part of it and rejecting the other part. 
Dr. Tawfik Hassan Farag states, 
This is what should be applied if we seek to maintain family life and close the door before any claim by the husband that 
he has the right to make his divorce effective by his unilateral will. Thus, if there is a dispute as to the application of 
Islamic Sharia Law, and whether the conditions of divorce of other religions or sects apply or not, a Christian husband 
must not be allowed to benefit from the provisions of Islamic Sharia Law before it is decided for him. But in the second 
case where there is no dispute as regards the application of Islamic Sharia Law, then the husband would have the right to 
directly benefit from the application of this law, even if the extent of his benefit from such application is contested. The 
court ruling issued in this case would be a confirmation of his right. Therefore, if he had declared the divorce before the 
dispute then it would be valid from the date of his declaration of the divorce Sezgin, Y. (2013). 
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Then he adds, this should be the issue that has been considered by the Court of Cassation, and what has been established by 
the judiciary, that is the recognition of the husband’s right to declare divorce by his unilateral will, and to have this 
declaration of divorce recognized [Alwahdani, 2019]. 
Assessment of the Approach 
This approach is considered defective for the following reasons: 
1. That adopting it would lead to mixing the rights and duties of individuals depending on whether a dispute exists 
between the parties or not, whereas the basic objective of the law is to govern the attitudes and behaviour of individuals 
by determining their rights and duties, whether a dispute exists or not. The rights and duties of individuals should be the 
same in both cases. 
2. That it links the right of a non-Muslim to apply the principles of divorce of Islamic Sharia Law to his case and the 
dispute regarding its application. Thus, if such a dispute does not occur, then a non-Muslim would be entitled to apply 
it to his case with no need to refer to the courts. This means that this approach recognizes the right of a Christian 
husband to divorce his wife by his unilateral will on the basis of an arbitrary differentiation that has no roots in the law, 
for whether there is a dispute or not is an issue that cannot be controlled. And again, what is the relationship between 
the dispute’s relevance to the application of Islamic Sharia Law or to the right of the husband to divorce his wife by his 
sole unilateral will so that it may be consequently confirmed that the divorce did take place in the first instance from the 
date it had been validated by the court, whereas in the second case it would be valid from the date that it was declared 
by the unilateral will of the husband, as supporters of this approach claim? [Alwahdani, 2019] 
3. That stating that the principles of Islamic Sharia Law definitely apply to non-Muslims in certain cases, for example, if a 
court ruling had been issued confirming that it is the principles of Islamic Sharia Law that govern the relationship 
between the husband and wife, or for example, if the husband had changed his religion or sect in an indisputably 
official manner, is unacceptable. For, in this case, the court ruling may not be used as a basis for proving the legislative 
jurisdiction. Moreover, either the husband or the wife may decide to change his or her religion or sect after the issuing 
of such ruling, and hence the principles of this newly adopted faith shall apply to this case instead of the principles of 
Islamic Sharia Law [Shirvani, Mohammadi & Shirvani, 2015]. 
4. That it is not true, as the supporters of this approach claim, that divorce in the first case becomes valid on the date of 
the court ruling validating it, on the grounds that it is this ruling that grants a non-Muslim husband the rights of a 
Muslim husband, for it is the law that provides for the application of Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims and 
consequently grants a non-Muslim husband the rights of a Muslim husband in the case where the husband and wife are 
of different religions or sects, and that in such case the role of the judge is confined to the application of the law should 
such a dispute be referred to him. This is because the source of legislation is the law and not the judiciary. Thus, a non-
Muslim husband would enjoy the same rights as a Muslim husband the moment the conditions of application of the 
special religion do not apply. For as of this moment, the relationships between non-Muslims would be governed by 
Islamic Sharia Law. The role of the judge, in this case, would only be to make sure that the terms and conditions do not 
apply, for the ruling of the judge is not one of the prerequisites for the application of Islamic Sharia Law Al‐Qazzaz, A. 
(1978). 
5. And finally, that linking the application of Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims with the necessity of the existence of a 
dispute between the husband and wife leads to the non-application of Islamic Sharia Law on these relationships: “For 
in all cases, such a dispute does arise and does not abate except only in one case, namely, when both husband and wife 
conspire not to apply the principles of Islamic Sharia Law, and such conspiring is prohibited by the legislator” and 
hence would have no consequences whatsoever [Shirvani, Mohammadi & Shirvani, 2015]. 
CONCLUSION 
Now that we have concluded considering to what extent a Christian husband has the right to divorce his wife by his 
unilateral will in Egyptian law, it has become evident that Egyptian jurisprudence is divided regarding the right of a non-
Muslim husband to divorce his wife by his unilateral will in cases where the application of the terms for divorce in other 
sects and doctrines do not apply, in which case the provisions of Islamic Sharia Law do apply Fournier, K., & Khan, S. 
(2012). Supporters of the first approach believe that a Christian husband may not divorce his wife by his unilateral will, 
and that to make his divorce effective, he has to refer to the court to receive a court ruling validating such divorce. To 
justify this stand, it was stated that individuals may not apply Islamic Sharia Law by themselves, but it is the courts that 
have to validate such divorce. Supporters of the second approach believe that a Christian husband may divorce his wife by 
his unilateral will with no need to refer to the court to validate it. It was stated in support of this approach that so long as 
we have accepted the application of Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims in disputes of personal status should the husband 
and wife have different religions or sects or doctrines, then we should not apply part of it and discard the other, or else 
what would be the criteria for what we apply and what we discard? The law has provided for the application of Islamic 
Sharia Law in cases where the terms for divorce in other non-Muslim religions do not apply [Shirvani, Mohammadi & 
Shirvani, 2015]. 
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It is obvious that these two approaches agree that it must primarily be acknowledged that it is Islamic Sharia Law that is 
applicable so that a non-Muslim husband may divorce his wife by his unilateral will. But these two approaches do not 
agree in that the first approach grants a Christian husband this right after confirming that it is Islamic Sharia Law that is 
applicable to his case, while the second grants him this right to divorce his wife by his unilateral will even if such right was 
not acknowledged. Supporters of the third approach believe that we should differentiate between these two cases when 
applying Islamic Sharia Law to non-Muslims: The first case if there is a dispute as to the principle itself of whether Islamic 
Sharia Law is the applicable law or not, in which case the issue has to be referred to the court to decide whether it is the 
applicable law to the case or not. If the court decides that it is the applicable law, then the husband has the right to benefit 
from its provisions, that is, he has the right to divorce his wife by his unilateral will. The other case is if the application of 
Islamic Sharia Law is not disputed in principle; hence, the husband would directly benefit from its provisions and divorce 
his wife by his unilateral will, and the divorce would be effective as of the date of his declaration of the divorce. In 
justification of this stand, it was stated that this is what the law itself has provided for, namely, that Islamic Sharia Law 
must be applied if the terms and conditions for divorce in other religions do not apply, “Taking into consideration the wish 
to maintain and protect family relationships, and to abort any possible claim by the husband that he may divorce his wife 
by his unilateral will” [Shirvani, Mohammadi & Shirvani, 2015]. 
It seems to us that the second approach is preponderant as it is compatible with the provisions of the law Sharafeldin, M. 
(2013). 
These provisions do not include any restrictions preventing a non-Muslim husband from benefitting from the principles of 
divorce in Islamic Sharia Law except the restriction mentioned in paragraph 7 of the above-mentioned Article 99. We 
believe that this legislative restriction cannot be applied unless either the non-Muslim husband or the wife is a Catholic, in 
which case the claim for divorce would not be acceptable and consequently the divorce would not enter into force by the 
unilateral will of the husband. Thus, except for this special case, it has to be admitted that a non-Muslim husband may 
benefit from the provisions of Islamic Sharia Law in the application of the very clear provision of Article 6 of law No. 462 
Al-Sharmani, M. (2014). This means that a non-Muslim husband, exactly like a Muslim husband, may divorce his wife by 
his unilateral will. This is the stand that has been established by the Egyptian judiciary, as mentioned earlier. This is the 
stand of the positive law; it is clear and distinct, and there is no doubt that jurisprudence may apply it as it wishes and 
propose amending it in any way. But jurisprudence has no right to add a restriction to the legal provisions, as only the 
legislator may do that. This reduces the importance of the social motives that may lead to the initiation of this or other 
restrictions. Should this solution be criticized, this would mean that there is need for a legislative amendment [Shirvani, 
Mohammadi & Shirvani, 2015]. 
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